In a recent article, Elliot Sober responds to challenges to a counter-example that he posed some years earlier to the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC). I agree that Sober has indeed produced a genuine counter-example to the PCC, but argue against the methodological moral that Sober wishes to draw from it. Contrary to Sober, I argue that the possibility of exceptions to the PCC does not undermine its status as a central assumption for methods that endeavor to draw causal conclusions from statistical data. Sober's counter-example to the PCC involves two variables, Venetian sea levels (V) and British bread prices (B). The counter-example consists in observing that the values of both of these variables have been steadily increasing over the past two centuries (Sober [1987] , pp. 214-15). Thus, if we Brit.
take the units of the population to be time intervals, say one year each, then V and B are probabilistically dependent. However, it seems doubtful that there is a common cause of V and B. Rather, the dependence appears to result from independently operating processes causing the British bread prices and Venetian tides to increase over time. Hence, V and B are not causally connected but probabilistically dependent, thus contradicting the PCC.
What underlies Sober's counter-example is the following theorem concerning the probability distribution formed by mixing the distributions from two populations, in each of which the variables in question are probabilistically independent.
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Mixing Theorem: Let PðXY Þ ¼ nP 1 ðXY Þ þ mP 2 ðXY Þ, where n and m are real numbers greater than zero such that n þ m ¼ 1. Let P 1 ðXY Þ ¼ P 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ and P 2 ðXY Þ ¼ P 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ. Then PðXY Þ ¼ PðX ÞPðY Þ if and only if P 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ þ P 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ ¼ P 1 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ þ P 2 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ.
A proof of the mixing theorem is given in the appendix. The mixing theorem has the following corollary:
Corollary: Let PðXY Þ ¼ nP 1 ðXY Þ þ mP 2 ðXY Þ, where n and m are both real numbers greater than zero such that n þ m ¼ 1. Let P 1 ðXY Þ ¼ P 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ and P 2 ðXY Þ ¼ P 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ. Then PðXY Þ 6 ¼ PðX ÞPðY Þ if and only if P 1 ðX Þ 6 ¼ P 2 ðX Þ and P 1 ðY Þ 6 ¼ P 2 ðY Þ.
The corollary is an immediate consequence of the mixing theorem together with the algebraic fact that, for any real numbers w, x, y and z, xz þ wy 6 ¼ wz þ xy if and only if w 6 ¼ x and y 6 ¼ z. The interest of the mixing theorem and its corollary lies in suggesting that probabilistic dependencies violating the PCC can sometimes be created by mixing unrelated populations.
Consider how this works in the case of the Venice-Britain counter-example. It is plausible to suppose that within reasonably short time intervals, say just a few years, V and B are probabilistically independent. That is, the parallel increase in the two variables is only apparent in long stretches of time, say, at least several decades. Let P 1 (VB) be the joint distribution within one of these reasonably short time-periods and P 2 (VB) that for a similarly brief but significantly later interval. By hypothesis, V and B are independent in both distributions. But since Venetian sea levels and British bread prices are gradually rising, the means of P 2 (V) and P 2 (B) are higher than those of their counterparts P 1 (V) and P 1 (B). Let P(VB) be the distribution formed by combining the distributions P 1 and P 2 . Therefore, by the corollary to the mixing theorem, PðVBÞ 6 ¼ PðV ÞPðBÞ. But since there is no causal connection between V and B, the PCC entails that PðVBÞ ¼ PðV ÞPðBÞ.
Although this formulation of the counter-example may appear rather technical, a simple intuitive rationale underlies it. When the distributions from the distinct time-periods are mixed, knowing the value of V provides information about whether one is in the earlier or the later epoch. But since bread prices also depend on time, this latter information tells us something about the value of B. However, in each of the separate time-periods, knowing the value of V does not provide any information about the value of B. The probabilistic structure in this case is exactly parallel to that of familiar examples of common causes that screen off their effects. For instance, learning that a person has nicotine-stained teeth tells us that he smokes, which provides information about whether he will get lung cancer. Yet when we divide up the population according to smoking habits, we find that nicotine-stained teeth and lung cancer are independent in each group. The only difference between this case and the Venice-Britain example is that, unlike smoking, time is not the sort of thing that one would naturally think of as a common cause.
Observe that the above reconstruction of Sober's counter-example is posed solely in terms of probabilities, not samples of statistical data. Moreover, the unwanted probabilistic dependence is shown to follow straightforwardly from a theorem and assumptions that are plausible in the case at hand. Hence, it is futile to object to the counter-example on the grounds that it involves only a sample association but no genuine probabilistic dependence. Kevin Hoover ([2001] ) presses this line of response, maintaining that 'probabilistically independent' should be defined differently for distributions, like the one in the VeniceBritain example, which change with time. However, the standard definition of 'probabilistically independent' used here (i.e., the variables X and Y are probabilistically independent just in case PðXY Þ ¼ PðX ÞPðY Þ) is entirely general and not tied to any specific class of distributions.
Making non-stationary time series stand still
In the language of statistics, the time series of both British bread prices and Venetian sea levels are non-stationary. A stationary time series can be defined like so:
A time series is said to be strictly stationary if the joint distribution of Xðt 1 Þ, . . ., Xðt n Þ, is the same as the joint distribution of Xðt 1 þ tÞ, . . ., Xðt n þ tÞ for all t 1 , . . ., t n , t. (Chatfield [1984], p. 35) The value of each XðtÞ represents the outcome at each time t. For instance, XðtÞ might represent the gross national product in a particular year. So the definition asserts that a series is strictly stationary just in case the time at which the series begins has no effect on the probability distribution.
Clearly, this definition is not fulfilled in the Venice-Britain example, in which the means of both the bread prices and Venetian sea levels are assumed to gradually increase over time. Thus, the probability distributions of both B and V within the period 1990-2000 are very different from their counterparts in the decade 1890-1900. The connection between the above definition and the discussion of the foregoing section is immediate. Both series B and series V are non-stationary, but in relatively short time intervals B and V are probabilistically independent. Hence, the mixing theorem entails that B and V are probabilistically dependent in distributions formed by combining joint distributions over V and B drawn from separate historical periods. Moreover, the mixing theorem and its corollary tell us that when either V or B is stationary, the undesired association vanishes.
The upshot of all this is that the PCC cannot be applied to non-stationary time series-at least not until some precautionary measures have been taken. The precautionary measures can take several forms, but the most straightforward is to transform the variables in a manner that makes the distribution stationary. Textbooks on time series analysis describe a variety of methods for accomplishing this end (cf. Chatfield [1984] , Hamilton [1994] , Clements and Hendry [1999] ). One of the most common of these methods is to consider changes in the variable over specified units of time rather than variable itself. To see how this works, consider a simple example of a nonstationary probability model, the familiar 'random walk'. A series is said to be a random walk when it takes the following form (cf. Chatfield [1984] , p. 41):
Where Z is a normally distributed variable with the mean m and variance s 2 . Assuming that the process is started from t ¼ 0, EðX t Þ ¼ tm and VarðX t Þ ¼ ts 2 . Since the mean and the variance of X 1 depend on t, the series is non-stationary. But now suppose we define DX t ¼ X t À X tÀ1 . Then from (1):
Thus, the probability distribution of DX t is the same as that of Z t , which is stationary. If time is being measured on a continuous scale, differentiating with respect to t has the same effect-that is, dtm=dt ¼ m and dts 2 =dt ¼ s 2 . Since a normal distribution is determined by its mean and standard deviation, differentiating with respect to t results in a stationary time series.
A concern about this strategy is that it might erase probabilistic dependencies arising from causal connections along with those deriving from other sources. For instance, consider two pieces of shrapnel emanating from a single explosion. 3 The two trajectories constitute parallel nonstationary time series. So might not differentiating with respect to time eliminate all probabilistic dependence between the shrapnel pieces despite their common cause? Let us consider the example more carefully. Suppose that air resistance is minimal enough to be ignored for the purposes of analysis. Then the only force acting upon the shrapnel other than the force of the blast is the downward gravitational force. Starting with position and then differentiating with respect to time leaves us with velocity, which in this case we can treat as having only two components: a vertical and a horizontal velocity. But the horizontal velocity is a stationary time series, since it is orthogonal to the gravitational force. That is, in the absence of air resistance, the horizontal velocity is constant throughout the flight of the shrapnel. Hence, the horizontal velocity of one bit of shrapnel provides information about the force of the detonation, which in turn provides information about the horizontal velocity of the other piece of shrapnel. In contrast, British bread prices provide information about Venetian tides (and vice versa) only in virtue of telling us something about the time. Hence, eradicating the influence of time upon the distribution eliminates the probabilistic dependence in the Venice-Britain example, but not in the case of the explosion. Since there is a substantial extant literature on the topic of transforming non-stationary time series into stationary ones, I refer those interested in further details to textbook treatments of the issue (Chatfield [1984] , Hamilton [1994] , Clements and Hendry [1999] ). What I want to explore here are the philosophical consequences of the above discussion. This discussion has not shown that the Venice-Britain case is a spurious counter-example to the PCC. The counter-example might not work for the variables DV t and DB t , but it goes through for V and B all the same. Rather, what has been shown is that this genuine counter-example need not undermine attempts to use the PCC as a basis for causal inference. Two points are relevant here.
First, as Hoover ([2001] ) argues, it is possible to recognize that a probability distribution is non-stationary without knowing very much about the causal structure that generates that distribution. The presence of a non-stationary distribution is often obvious from 'eyeball' assessments of the time series data, and texts on time series analysis describe more sophisticated statistical tests for this purpose. Moreover, equations like (1) need not be interpreted in a causal way. Thus, (1) only tells us that X tÀ1 can be used to predict X t . It does not say that X tÀ1 is a cause of X t , though that is often a serious possibility. Hence, it is not the case, as Sober suggests ([2001] , p. 333), that his example shows that the PCC can be used as a basis for causal inference only when we already know a great deal about the causal processes at work. Second, the above discussion illustrates how researchers interested in drawing causal conclusions from statistical data can design their investigation so that counter-examples like Sober's are not a concern. For instance, if the series is non-stationary but transformable into a stationary one via differentiating with respect to time, then differentiate. Then the PCC can be invoked without concern for the difficulty illustrated by the Venice-Britain example. In such a case, the PCC may still fail for the undifferentiated variables. But that is not a problem for the purposes of causal inference, as long as we remember not to apply the PCC to them. However, it would be foolhardy to propose that the PCC be restricted to cases in which the variables have been differentiated with respect to time. If the original distribution is stationary, then differentiating is superfluous or worse. Moreover, taking the first difference is not always sufficient to render the time series stationary.
What matters, then, is not so much whether the PCC is a truth of universal scope. Rather what is important is that it obtains in those circumstances in which we wish to employ it for the purpose of causal inference. Since some aspects of these circumstances are under own control, it is possible to design our investigation so as to create conditions favorable to the PCC. It might be possible to invent a non-stationary time series that cannot be transformed into a stationary one by any known method. However, as long as such cases are not common in those fields in which we wish to use the PCC to draw causal inferences, the usefulness of the PCC would not be impugned. Thus, although Sober's counter-example demonstrates that the PCC is not infallible, it fails to show that it cannot function as a central assumption for methods that endeavor to make causal inferences from statistical data.
Sober's alternative
A persistent theme in Sober's discussions of the PCC is that it should not be viewed as a categorical imperative that enjoins one to infer the existence of a causal connection between any two variables found to be probabilistically associated. Thus, whether a causal connection or something else is the most probable explanation of a correlation between two variables is argued to depend on the particular features of the case at hand (cf. Sober [1984] , [1987] , [2001] ). The claim that the PCC is not an incontrovertible postulate of epistemology is entirely consistent with the approach to the principle argued for above. But Sober wishes to extract a further methodological conclusion from the fallibility of the PCC, namely, that methods that endeavor to draw causal conclusions from statistical data should not give the principle special pride of place ([2001] , pp. 342-3). Rather, Sober suggests, such methods of causal inference should take the Likelihood Principle (LP) as their fundamental assumption (Ibid., pp. 342-3). The LP states that the evidence E favors the hypothesis H 1 over H 2 if and only if PðEjH 1 Þ > PðEjH 2 Þ. In spite of agreeing with Sober with respect to the fallibility of the PCC, I think that there are good reasons for rejecting his methodological conclusion.
Making inferences about causation from statistical data can be thought of as a two-step process. First, infer probabilities from statistical data; second, make inferences about causation from the probabilities. The LP is a principle designed to deal with the first step: it tells us that the probability model best supported by the statistical data is the one which renders that data most likely. What the LP does not provide, however, is a basis for making inferences about causation from probability-that is the role of the PCC and other related principles.
To appreciate the importance of the PCC to causal inference, consider its role in the context of what is generally taken to be the most reliable means for learning about causal relationships: the randomized controlled experiment. Suppose we plan to perform a randomized controlled experiment to decide whether a certain treatment (T ) is a cause of recovery (R). Such an experiment aims to arrange a set of conditions in which there are no common causes of T and R (and R does not cause T ). Suppose that the experiment succeeds in this. Imagine, furthermore, that T and R are associated in the data from the experiment. Given this result, the LP favors the hypothesis that T and R are probabilistically dependent over the hypothesis that they are not. In other words, the LP can support inferences from statistical data to conclusions about probability distributions. But what we want to know is whether T causes R, and without some premise concerning the relationship between causality and probability, we cannot answer this question.
Sober does grant the assumption that T and R are correlated when T causes R, provided that there are not conflicting pathways from T to R ([2001] , p. 344). 4 However, treatments evaluated in clinical trials often have side-effects, so it is doubtful that there would be a justification in examples like the present one for supposing that no such counteracting paths exist. Hence, the most one could say about the hypothesis that T causes R is that it is consistent with a probabilistic dependence between these two variables. But, unless the PCC is assumed to be in some form applicable to the present context, the same can be said for the hypothesis that T does not cause R. Thus, without the aid of the PCC, the LP is at a loss to account for causal inference even in the context of a randomized controlled experiment.
Given that Sober is willing to grant some assumptions that serve as a bridge from causality to probability, what motivation is there for not allowing the PCC to be invoked in this context? For the PCC is just such a claim: if two variables are not causally connected, they are probabilistically independent. The Venice-Britain example is not relevant in the context of a randomized experiment, since the values of T are assigned via a purely random process, and T is strictly stationary. Hence, the corollary to the mixing theorem tells us that there can be no worries about unwanted dependencies being produced by time series in this context. Randomized controlled experiments are commonly judged the most reliable means for testing qualitative causal hypotheses, and the PCC clearly plays an important part in the underlying rationale for such experiments.
The above discussion illustrates how efforts to draw causal inferences from statistical data would be left in a hopeless state without the PCC. Moreover, some counter-examples notwithstanding, the principle is quite plausible in a wide range of cases, and the potential for exceptions can be reduced through prudent research designs. Thus, the PCC arguably strikes a good balance between the desiderata of accuracy and inferential power, thereby elevating it to the status of an assumption of central importance for methods of causal inference.
(1) PðXY Þðn þ mÞ ¼ PðX ÞPðY Þ Then from the assumptions: (2) ðnP 1 ðXY Þ þ mP 2 ðXY ÞÞðn þ mÞ ¼ ðnP 1 ðX Þ þ mP 2 ðX ÞÞðnP 1 ðY Þ þ mP 2 ðY ÞÞ The right-hand side of (2) is equivalent to: (3) n 2 P 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ þ nmP 1 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ þ mnP 2 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ þ m 2 P 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ while the left-hand side of (2) is: (4) n 2 P 1 ðXY Þ þ nmP 1 ðXY Þ þ mnP 2 ðXY Þ þ m 2 P 2 ðXY Þ Given our independence assumptions, (4) equals: (5) n 2 P 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ þ nmP 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ þ mnP 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ þ m 2 P 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ Thus, putting the right-and left-hand sides (i.e., (3) and (5)) back together and collecting terms we have: (6) P 2 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ þ P 1 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ ¼ P 1 ðX ÞP 2 ðY Þ þ P 2 ðX ÞP 1 ðY Þ Starting from (6), we can work backwards in the same manner to get PðXY Þ ¼ PðX ÞPðY Þ. QED
